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African Resistance to the International Criminal Court: halting the advance of the anti-
impunity norm  
Introduction 
After having discontinued its case against Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta in December 
2014, in April 2016 the International Criminal Court (ICC) also terminated its case against 
Vice-President William Ruto, effectively admitting defeat in its attempt to hold the most 
senior Kenyan officials accountable for election violence in 2007/08. Once a keen supporter 
of the ICC, Kenya was now a foe and had ‘giv[en] the world a rule book on how to beat the 
ICC’.1 But this was just the latest setback the ICC has suffered in Africa, with the ongoing 
controversy over the 2009 decision to issue an arrest warrant for Sudan’s President Omar al-
Bashir also framing an evolving conflict between Africa and the ICC and eventually leading to 
three African states announcing in late 2016 that they would leave the ICC.  
The ICC’s mission is fundamentally defined or informed by the anti-impunity norm. And the 
ICC is dedicated to enforcing a ‘strong’ version of this norm – meaning all perpetrators of 
mass atrocity crimes, including states’ highest officials, can be held accountable before 
competent courts. This article’s primary purpose is to explore the dynamics of African 
resistance to the effort to entrench anti-impunity, and what effect this has had on the norm 
(and, by implication, the ICC). Because we focus on African resistance we cannot presume to 
offer a definitive assessment of the anti-impunity norm’s progress towards becoming the 
normative status quo. Instead, our findings are limited to just one piece of this wider 
empirical puzzle, although this is a particularly important piece given most of the active 
situations under investigation in the ICC’s brief concern Africa. To clarify the scope of our 
argument, we readily acknowledge that international actors have resisted the ICC in various 
ways and for various reasons. Most obviously, as of 1 July 2017 124 states had joined,2 
meaning one third of states are not members. Declining to join thus remains a powerful 
form of resistance. And many motivations animate these decisions: for example, the 
1 Rashid Abdi, quoted in David Pilling, ‘Bungled Kenyan cases spotlight ICC’s image problem’, Business Day, 16 
April 2016. 
2 30 others had signed but not ratified. 
This article has been published in a revised form in Review of International Studies [http://doi.org/XXX]. This version is 
free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. 
© the Author(s)
 2 
relatively rushed negotiation and drafting process of the Rome Statute contributed to some 
state’s decisions to not join.3 Washington’s position has also been justified by David Scheffer 
with reference to the fact it ‘has special responsibilities and special exposure to political 
controversy’.4 Further, Jack Goldsmith has argued that Washington, Beijing and Moscow 
were all concerned that the ICC might intrude upon the Security Council’s responsibility for 
international peace and security.5 More generally, many states were, and remain, 
concerned that the ICC threatens their sovereignty; for example, India has expressed this 
concern repeatedly.6 Nevertheless, we focus on resistance to the ICC and the version of the 
anti-impunity norm which envisages indicting sitting Heads of State and Government from 
African member-states because this sort of ‘insider’ resistance is both very prominent 
recently and it is potentially very damaging to the wider effort to establish the ICC as an 
effective institution and to entrench the anti-impunity norm. 
 
We structure our analysis by deploying an agent-centric framework which distinguishes 
overtly between norm entrepreneurs and norm antipreneurs. The ‘antipreneur’ term was 
introduced recently by Alan Bloomfield7 to highlight that those who resist entrepreneurs’ 
efforts to challenge the existing normative status quo often enjoy under-appreciated 
defensive advantages. Accordingly, a secondary purpose of this article is to test this 
framework’s utility. The article proceeds as follows. We first explain how the entrepreneur-
antipreneur framework is both deployed and tested. The next section explains why we treat 
the anti-impunity norm as the ‘challenger norm’ before the key sites of contestation and the 
key African actors are examined. The longest sections of the paper examine how, when and 
why African actors resisted the anti-impunity norm, focusing on how the African Union (AU) 
itself, and several key states, shifted from entrepreneurial towards antipreneurial roles over 
time. Finally, in the conclusion we explain why the phenomenon of African resistance to the 
ICC poses a serious obstacle to the effort to advance and entrench the anti-impunity norm 
                                                 
3 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court’, Cornell International Law Journal 32 (1999), pp. 443-469.  
4 ‘The United States and the International Criminal Court’, American Journal of International Law 93:1 (1999), 
12. 
5 ‘The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court’, University of Chicago Law Review 70:1 (2003) pp. 90-91. 
6 Usha Ramanathan, ‘India and the ICC’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 3: (2005), pp. 627-634. 
7 ‘Norm Antipreneurs and Theorising Resistance to Normative Change’, Review of International Studies 42:2 
(2016), pp. 310-333. 
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and is responsible for stalling the advancement of the norm, discuss why we find the 
antipreneur concept has some, but limited, utility in this case, and consider a few potential 
directions for future research. 
 
 
The Entrepreneur-Antipreneur Framework 
Bloomfield offered the notion of the ‘norm antipreneur’ as a corrective to a norm dynamics 
research agenda ‘beset with selection biases’ towards the ‘more noticeable’ cases in which 
entrepreneurs succeeded in changing the normative status in an issue-area, meaning the 
phenomenon of resistance had been undertheorised.8 He argued further that antipreneurs 
often enjoyed under-appreciated ‘defensive advantages’9 given the socio-psychological 
biases by which most human collectivities, most of the time, prefer the status quo,10 and 
that antipreneurs also often benefit from opportunities to delay or frustrate, or even 
entirely block, entrepreneurs’ discrete initiatives.11 Ultimately, Bloomfield’s argument rests 
on the insight that entrepreneurs must take the initiative – they must first generate, then 
sustain, momentum for change – while antipreneurs will often have to expend less political 
capital and/or take fewer risks to blunt or derail entrepreneurs’ efforts (which is not to 
suggest antipreneurs will always win; these advantages are arguably power and/or skill 
‘multipliers’).12  
 
This study deploys the strategic/tactical resistance dichotomy Bloomfield developed to 
theorise the conceptual relationship between various types of resistance practiced by 
African states to anti-impunity. Specifically, we treat justifications for resisting as ‘strategic’ 
                                                 
8 ‘Norm Antipreneurs’, p. 312 
9 ‘Norm Antipreneurs’, pp. 322-326. 
10 Jeffrey W. Legro, ‘The Transformation of Policy Ideas’, American Journal of Political Science 44:3 (2000), pp. 
426-429; James Mahoney ‘Path Dependence in Historical Sociology’, Theory and Society 29:4 (2000), pp. 507-
548. 
11 George Tsebelis, ‘Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, 
Multicameralism and Multipartyism’, British Journal of Political Science 25:3 (1995), pp. 289-325. 
12 ‘Norm Antipreneurs’, p. 326 
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resistance, and discrete moves by actors to resist as ‘tactical’ resistance.13 This distinction is 
not necessarily a sharp one – both categories of resistance are, in effect, mutually 
constitutive – but it is nevertheless useful analytically. But, and crucially, Bloomfield 
conceded that antipreneurs may only enjoy inherent defensive advantages when the 
normative status quo is deeply entrenched in practice, and/or when it is deeply 
institutionalised.14 This study tests this assumption and asks whether this is one such case.  
 
Bloomfield also offered an agent-centric framework for analysing the dynamics prevailing in 
particular norm contestation contexts. Specifically, overtly distinguishing entrepreneurs 
from antipreneurs enables the creation of a spectrum of ‘roles’ which agents might play 
(and these are treated as labels or categories which describe motives and behaviour, not 
normative judgements; antipreneurs are not always ‘bad’ and entrepreneurs always 
‘good’15). As Figure 1 illustrates, ‘pure entrepreneurs’ seek substantial normative change 
while ‘pure antipreneurs’ implacably defend the normative status quo. But other actors may 
have somewhat different intentions vis-à-vis the normative status quo: ‘competitor 
entrepreneurs’, for example, might seek different or less-radical change, while ‘creative 
resisters’ may concede to some degree of normative change while still primarily defending 
the status quo.16  
 
Figure 1. The Norm Dynamics Role-Spectrum 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 ‘Norm Antipreneurs’, pp. 322-323. 
14 ‘Norm Antipreneurs’, p. 321. 
15 ‘Norm Antipreneurs’, p. 313, and others (Amitav Acharya, ‘The R2P and Norm Diffusion: Towards a 
Framework of Norm Circulation’, Global Responsibility to Protect 5:1 (2013), pp. 466-479; Charlotte Epstein 
(2013) ‘Stop Telling Us How to Behave: Socialization and Infantilization?’, International Studies Perspectives 
13:2 (2013), pp. 135-145) have argued that much of the norms literature reveals ‘liberal’ bias by implicitly 
presenting a picture of ‘enlightened/good’ – and usually Western – entrepreneurs promoting, for example, 
human rights norms against resistance by ‘unenlightened/bad’ actors.  
16 ‘Norm Antipreneurs’, pp. 329-331. 
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Most actors probably fall into the intermediate zone, and they might shift along the role-
spectrum over time. This latter insight is particularly important given that the meta-
narrative of this study is that several African actors have recently moved towards the 
antipreneurial end – although in nuanced and complex ways.  
 
The insight that actors’ roles can change can in turn be utilised to determine which of three 
norm dynamics models offered by Amitav Acharya might best explain the ‘prevailing 
dynamics’ in this case at particular points in time. Acharya’s ‘norm localisation’ model 
described how when local actors respond to external pressure from ‘the centre’ – i.e. 
Western states and the IGOs those states dominate – they sometimes essentially adapted 
new norms to suit their local circumstances (2004).17 But he later offered the ‘norm 
subsidiarity’ model to explain how local actors resisted new norms by invoking ‘existing 
common global norms … vital to preserving their autonomy … like sovereignty [and] … self-
determination’.18 Eventually Acharya combined these into a ‘norm circulation’ model which 
described local actors at first resisting, but then feeding-back a ‘reworked’ version of the 
new norm to the centre, demanding refinements to the norm’s scope and content before 
they accept it.19 Thus identifying whether key actors are shifting into different roles – 
adapting, resisting or seeking to renegotiate – offers clues regarding likely outcomes of 
norm contestation cases, which in turn hints at the strategies norm entrepreneurs might 
pursue to successfully entrench the norm they are promoting. 
 
 
The Normative Contest, and Key Sites and Actors 
                                                 
17 ‘How Ideas Spread’, International Organization 58:2 (2004), pp. 239-75. 
18 ‘Norm Subsidiarity and Regional Orders: Sovereignty, Regionalism, and Rule-Making in the Third World’, 
International Studies Quarterly 55:1 (2011), pp. 96-102. 
19 ‘The R2P and Norm Diffusion: Towards a Framework of Norm Circulation’, Global Responsibility to Protect 
5:1 (2013), pp. 466-479. 
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We follow convention and define a norm as a ‘standard of appropriate behavior for actors 
of a given identity’.20 More specifically, we treat the anti-impunity norm (detailed below) as 
the challenger norm even though it has already been formally codified in the Rome Statute21 
and a formal institution, the ICC, has been established to implement it. We do so for two 
interconnected reasons. First, the absence of world government means ‘the authority of 
international law resides … in States recognis[ing] it as binding upon them’.22 Constructivists 
explain these ‘internal requirements’ for compliance as ‘felt’ effects: when a law’s or norm’s 
legitimacy is accepted by actors they ‘feel’ it is ‘right’ to comply.23 In other words, to be 
effective, international norms/laws must constitute actors’, becoming part of their 
identities, and thereby informing their interests and affecting their behaviour.24 Second, and 
more specifically, the ICC relies on states’ active assistance to perform many of its functions. 
Article 86 of the Rome Statute provides a general duty for parties to ‘cooperate fully’ and 
Articles 87 to 111 provide specific details. But we show below that many African actors’ 
behaviour suggests that they are not ‘fully constituted by’ many of the demands inherent in 
the anti-impunity norm, as prescribed in the Rome Statute.  
 
Thus, the fact a norm has been codified in a treaty does not by itself mean that it represents 
the normative status quo. State-practice should also generally conform with it too, which is 
not to say that there can be no violations at all; indeed, ‘no single [violation] refutes a norm. 
Not even many such occurrences necessarily do’.25 But the word ‘norm’ itself describes 
                                                 
20 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International 
Organization 52:4 (1998), p. 891. 
21 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) UNTS vol. 2187 no. 38544, in force 1 July 2002. 
Article 25 establishes that the ICC has ‘jurisdiction over natural persons’ (who have allegedly committed mass 
atrocity crimes (Articles 5 to 8)), while Article 27 specifies that the ‘Statute shall apply equally to all persons 
without any distinction based on official capacity’ and that ‘[i]mmunities or special procedural rules which may 
attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court 
from exercising its jurisdiction’. 
22 Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘The Foundations of The Authority of International Law and The Problem of 
Enforcement’, Modern Law Review 19:1 (1956), p. 8. 
23 Martha Finnemore and Stephen J. Toope, ‘Alternatives to “Legalization”: Richer Views of Law and Politics’, 
International Organization 55:3 (2001), p. 749. 
24 Matthew J. Hoffman ‘Norms and Social Constructivism in International Relations’, in Robert A. Denemark 
(ed.), The International Studies Encyclopedia (Blackwell Reference Online, 2014), pp. 1-3. 
25 Friedrich Kratochwil and John G. Ruggie, ‘A State of the Art on an Art of the State’, International 
Organization 40:4 (1986), p. 767. 
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patterns of behaviour that are, in effect, ‘normal’,26 implying there should be more 
compliance than not. Reactions to violations matter too: strong criticism, and especially 
punishment for violation, also suggests a norm is relatively strong/entrenched.27  
 
Our analysis is therefore broadly situated in the constructivist paradigm, meaning we do not 
treat states’ interests as givens. The relationship between norms and interests is a complex 
one, but we accept that norms constitute actor’s identities, and that interests flow from 
identities; in effect, interests ultimately derive from norms.28 More specifically, we apply 
Thomas Risse’s notion of the ‘logic of argument’ and treat actors as not necessarily strongly-
constituted by a particular norm – which could imply they follow it ‘mindlessly’29 – but 
instead actors argue about ‘which norms apply under given circumstances’.30 This implies 
states have a sort of ‘menu’ of competing norms from which to choose when formulating 
responses in discrete circumstances. Accordingly, we must examine the status quo and 
other norms which African actors’ invoke to justify their resistance, before we examine the 
precise normative features (and evolution of) the anti-impunity challenger norm. 
 
The status-quo norm: sovereign immunity 
The most fundamental status quo norm is state sovereignty. It is the constitutive norm of 
the international system and it is deeply entrenched: the principle of sovereign equality 
(Article 2(1)) and the rights of non-interference (Article 2(7)) and self-determination (Article 
1(2)) appear in the UN Charter.  
 
                                                 
26 Andrew Hurrell ‘Norms and Ethics in International Relations’, in Walter E. Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth 
A. Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations (New York: Sage, 2002), p. 143. 
27 Richard Price treats three factors – ‘support’, ‘compliance’, and ‘third party reactions’ – as relevant to 
assessing norm-strength: ‘Detecting Ideas and their Effects’, in Robert E. Goodwin and Charles Tilly (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).  
28 For the general theory see: Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of 
Structuration (Cambridge: Polity Press; 1984). Also see: Jutta Weldes, ‘Constructing National Interests’, 
European Journal of International Relations 2:3 (1996), 275-318; and Hoffmann, ‘Norms and Social 
Constructivism’, pp 1-3. 
29 Ibid., Hoffman, pp. 7-8. 
30 Thomas Risse, ‘Let’s Argue: Communicative Action in World Politics’, International Organization 54:1 (2000), 
p. 7. 
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A closely-related norm – which existed in customary international law well before the UN 
Charter – is sovereign immunity. Strictly speaking, this establishes that a state cannot be 
subject to external courts’ jurisdiction, but two other closely-related and ‘personal’ 
immunities flow from it: diplomatic immunity and Head of State immunity. Both are 
primarily based in functional considerations, namely, the need for a state’s representatives 
to travel freely to conduct diplomacy, although Head of State immunity is also informed by 
wider symbolic concerns like ‘respect for’ a state’s sovereign independence.31 These latter 
two norms are nested within the sovereign immunity norm which, in turn, flows directly 
from sovereignty itself. Sovereign immunity is deeply-entrenched: it was recently declared 
jus cogens by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)32; diplomatic immunity is also codified 
in Article 29 of the Vienna Convention; and while Head of State immunity is not codified, in 
2000 and 2001 both the ICJ33 and the US Supreme Court34 confirmed it applied to states’ 
leaders and other high-ranking officials. 
 
African states have practiced strategic resistance by invoking these norms as justifications 
for resisting anti-impunity, but they have also appealed to other related norms in the wider 
‘web of meanings’35 which constitutes the discursive terrain in which they operate. 
Specifically, they invoked anti-imperialism and Afrocentrism (or ‘African solidarity’ or ‘Pan-
Africanism’), the idea of ‘African solutions for African problems’ and the ‘African 
Renaissance’ agenda, as well as a norm which privileges peace over justice.  
 
The challenger norm: anti-impunity 
The first tentative steps to overturn sovereign immunity were taken in the immediate 
aftermath of World War II at Nuremberg and Tokyo.36 In the 1990s the International 
                                                 
31 Michael A. Tunks, ‘Diplomats or Defendants? Defining the Future of Head-of-State Immunity’, Duke Law 
Journal, 52:3 (2002), pp. 652-655. 
32 Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening, Judgment, ICJ Reports (2012), pp. 99-156. 
33 Congo v. Belgium, Judgement, ICJ Reports (2002), pp. 3-34. 
34 Tachiona v. Mugabe, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (S.D.N.Y.), 169 F. Supp. 2nd 
(2001). 
35 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), volume II, p. 226. 
36 Benjamin N. Schiff, Building the International Criminal Court (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
pp. 24-25. 
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Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in 1993 and 1994, and other ad 
hoc, hybrid international courts operated in Sierra Leone, Cambodia and Lebanon. Then, in 
1998, former Chilean President General Augusto Pinochet was arrested in the UK under the 
principle of universal jurisdiction. The British courts stripped Pinochet of immunity although 
his extradition to Spain was eventually waived for health reasons.37 The principle of 
universal jurisdiction remains hotly contested. Nevertheless, the Pinochet case signaled that 
a general norm against impunity was emerging, at least vis-à-vis former leaders. 
 
But the establishment of the ICC, also in 1998, marked the single-most significant 
development in the effort to entrench anti-impunity; David Bosco called it a ‘remarkable 
transfer of authority from sovereign states to an international institution’.38 A majority of 
states have joined,39 although key great powers like the United States, China, Russia and 
India remain aloof, which contributes to our decision to treat anti-impunity as an 
‘emerging’, challenger norm. Nevertheless, its codification in the Rome Statute means, at 
minimum, that it has gone beyond being ‘merely aspirational’.  
 
Importantly, the ICC does not exercise universal jurisdiction per se. Instead, member states 
must prosecute citizens and others directly related to member states who commit mass 
atrocities (including senior officials) and the ICC’s jurisdiction only becomes activated if they 
fail to do so (i.e. the principle of complementarity).40 The United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) can also refer a situation in a non-party to the ICC. Finally, as noted earlier, the 
Rome Statute requires parties – including those not directly involved in an investigation or 
prosecution – to assist the ICC. 
 
                                                 
37 Roht-Arriaza, Naomi, The Pinochet Effect: Transnational Justice (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2006). 
38 David Bosco, Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court’s Battle to Fix the World, One Prosecution at a 
Time (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 2. 
39 By 1 january 2017 124 states had ratified the Rome Statute. 30 others had signed but not ratified. 
40 William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 4th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), pp. 190-199. 
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As was the case vis-à-vis sovereign immunity norms, the anti-impunity norm is also related 
to other norms, most notably norms underpinning international humanitarian law and 
norms like the protection of civilians and the responsibility to protect. Promotion of these – 
and anti-impunity – should be seen as part of the wider effort underway since the 1990s to 
reconceptualise sovereignty and establish that how states treats their citizens is a matter of 
international concern.41 
 
Finally, the ICC has been trying to implement an anti-impunity norm which includes sitting 
Heads of State and Government (and other senior officials). It is obvious why the Rome 
Statute was framed this way: excluding them would be nonsensical given they are often 
responsible for ordering atrocity crimes. Further, to allow them to avoid prosecution while 
in office would allow them to continue to commit atrocity crimes, provide incentives for 
them to stay in office beyond their terms to avoid prosecution, and allow them to use a 
‘circumscribed’ anti-impunity norm against their enemies. This issue has become a focal 
point for resistance in Africa; we provide several examples below of African actors claiming 
to ‘support anti-impunity’, but only in a circumscribed (and therefore inherently 
problematic) form. 
 
Sites of contestation, and key African actors 
We have just examined the competing norms in this issue-area which states can pick and 
choose from when determining how to respond, for example, when the ICC issues an arrest 
warrant. But where they do so, and who the key actors are, requires explanation before the 
analysis of African resistance proper can begin. 
 
The ICC is frequently conflated with the Prosecutor, but this office is less a site of 
contestation than an actor, a ‘norm implementer’ which determines when to apply the anti-
impunity norm (and probably also a norm entrepreneur, expanding the practice and 
                                                 
41 Kofi Annan, ‘Two Concepts of Sovereignty’, The Economist, 352 (1999), pp. 49-50; Francis Deng, Sovereignty 
as Responsibility: Crisis Management in Africa (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996); Kurt Mills, 
Human Rights in the Emerging Global Order: A New Sovereignty? (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998). 
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understanding of anti-impunity). Contestation takes place in the Registry and pre-trial, trial, 
and appeals divisions: the ICC is a court after all. But the primary site of contestation which 
interests us – because states contest there – is the ICC’s Assembly of State Parties (ASP). All 
members have a seat and therefore a vote, and it meets annually. Importantly, a seven-
eighths vote is required to amend the Rome Statute, a significant impediment. 
 
The UNSC is another important site of contestation. Its resolutions may contain provisions 
which reflect various related normative urges (i.e. R2P, humanitarian access, anti-impunity, 
etc.) making it difficult at times to disentangle these norms.42 But the Rome Statute 
empowers the Council to both refer a situation in a non-party to the Prosecutor (Article 15) 
and to also defer any ICC investigation or prosecution for a renewable term of 12 months 
(Article 16). The latter power has attracted fierce contestation from African actors. The 
Council must be ‘acting under Chapter VII’ of the UN Charter, implying it must be attempting 
to remedy a threat to international peace and security. 
 
Contestation also takes place within the AU. 34 of its 54 members are parties to the Rome 
Statute, almost exactly the same proportion of members worldwide (63 per cent). But we 
primarily treat the AU as an actor because it has become the primary ‘vehicle’ for African 
states to organise resistance to anti-impunity; efforts to forge African solidarity take place 
and can be vested with legitimacy there. We focus mainly on the formal statements and 
actions of the AU’s supreme governing body, the Assembly (comprised of members’ Heads 
of State and Government) and its Peace and Security Council (PSC). The AU is not, however, 
a member of the ICC’s ASP, nor does it have formal standing in the UNSC: to influence 
deliberations in these forums the AU must induce a member-state to raise a matter and 
then lobby other African states to support such initiatives. 
 
While we treat the AU mainly as an actor, we do not ignore intra-AU dynamics. Practical 
limitations prevent us from exploring these exhaustively, but we do sketch how these 
                                                 
42Kurt Mills, International Responses to Mass Atrocities in Africa: Responsibility to Protect, Prosecute, and 
Palliate (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015). 
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dynamics have changed over time by examining how several key African states – ICC 
members Burundi, Gambia, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, and Uganda – have shifted from 
the entrepreneur towards the antipreneur end of the role-spectrum recently. We also 
provide a few examples of contestation over the anti-impunity norm between domestic 
institutions; we cannot examine all 34 African ICC members intensively, but we nevertheless 
want to acknowledge that African states are not necessarily unitary actors. 
 
The following sections examine how African resistance to anti-impunity has developed and 
increased over time. The first considers the period before Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir 
was indicted by the ICC, while the next and much longer section examines resistance 
thereafter. This organisation reflects how the request for an arrest warrant for al-Bashir 
became a critical turning point after which latent uneasiness towards the ICC blazed into 
open hostility and sustained resistance. 
 
 
‘Before al-Bashir’: adapting to anti-impunity, 2002-2008    
About a dozen African states were influential players in the drafting process leading to the 
Rome Statute and they ‘generally advanced progressive positions’.43 After it came into force 
in 2002, Botswana became the most prominent ICC supporter, with Zambia also providing 
significant support. South Africa and Kenya were also prominent entrepreneurs. Some 
African states always opposed the ICC and the anti-impunity norm. These typically 
authoritarian countries never joined and feel threatened by anti-impunity and other human 
rights norms making them, in effect, pure antipreneurs. Egypt and Eritrea are prominent 
examples, but Libya under Muammar Gaddafi – who eventually became the target of an ICC 
investigation via a 2011 UNSC referral – arguably took the lead. They tried to frame the 
issue within the AU by invoking status quo norms like sovereignty and sovereign immunity, 
as well as anti-imperialism and local African solidarity norms. We pay these states little 
                                                 
43 Charles C. Jalloh, Dapo Akande and Max du Plessis, ‘Assessing the African Union Concerns about Article 16 of 
the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court’, African Journal of Legal Studies 4:1 (2011), p. 14. 
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attention; we are primarily interested in states which have shifted from the entrepreneurial 
towards the antipreneurial end of the role-spectrum presented earlier. 
 
In the 2002-2008 period the African ICC members, and the AU, generally cooperated with 
the newly-operational ICC. The ICC’s first two cases were referred to the Prosecutor by 
Uganda in 2003 and the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2004, and they attracted little 
adverse comment in Africa. In 2003 Côte also formally granted the ICC limited jurisdiction. 
Notably, in 2004, an AU resolution urged its members to sign and/or ratify the Rome 
Statute,44 and in 2005 the UNSC’s referral of the situation in Darfur to the ICC also attracted 
little controversy.  
 
Then two events took place which were more suggestive of, in terms of Acharya’s multiple 
frameworks, ‘adaptation to’ (i.e. suggestive of his norm localisation model45) rather than 
simple ‘acceptance of’ anti-impunity. First, in 2003 Interpol issued an arrest warrant for 
former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor. Nigeria refused to action it without a request 
from Liberia, but when such came in 2006 Taylor was extradited to the ad hoc Special Court 
for Sierra Leone. Second, Senegalese courts had refused to try the former President of Chad, 
Hissène Habré, in the early 2000s, citing jurisdictional limitations, and Senegal’s government 
also refused to extradite him to Belgium pursuant to claims of universal jurisdiction. But in 
2006 the AU set up a ‘Committee of Eminent African Jurists’ to determine whether, and if 
so, how and where, he should be tried. It determined he should be tried, although it took 
considerable pressure from the AU, the Economic Community of the West African States, 
and several African states, especially Chad, to bring Habré to trial (which eventually 
commenced in 2015, in the AU-created ‘Extraordinary African Chamber’). 
 
These examples suggest that the anti-impunity norm was shaping the behaviour of many 
African actors in the 2002-2008 period. Some operated like pure entrepreneurs by 
                                                 
44 African Union, ‘Statement by Mr. Ben Kioko, Legal Counsel of the African Union Commission on Behalf of the 
AU Commission’, Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Kampala, 
Uganda, 31 May–11 June 2010. 
45 Acharya, ‘How Ideas Spread’. 
 14 
essentially cooperating fully with the ICC while others operated more like competitor 
entrepreneurs, pursing normative change – by advancing anti-impunity – but somewhat 
differently. Having said this, there were rumblings of discontent. These did not manifest 
themselves as direct resistance to how the ICC was applying the anti-impunity norm, but 
instead as resistance to the related principle of universal jurisdiction. 
 
To clarify, universal jurisdiction is an alternative method of applying anti-impunity: it 
envisages foreign domestic courts trying ‘alien’ citizens for crimes deemed so terrible they 
warrant being treated as ‘international’ crimes, while the Rome Statute provides for 
national courts to try citizens, and failing this, for an international court to do so. Rwanda 
emerged as the strongest resister of universal jurisdiction. It has long had a contentious 
relationship with international criminal justice mechanisms: after calling for the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Kigali was subsequently very critical of its 
operations46 and Rwanda resisted Western states’ attempts to prosecute members of the 
Tutsi-dominated government for crimes committed during and after the Hutu-led genocide 
(while implementing anti-impunity domestically against Hutu genocidaires).47 
  
On 1 July 2008 the AU Assembly passed a resolution which, while expressing general 
support for the principle of universal jurisdiction, also alleged ‘abuse’ (especially against 
members of the Rwandan government) and said attempts to invoke it against African 
leaders violated ‘the sovereignty and territorial integrity of these states’.48 The AU’s PSC 
issued a similar statement on 11 July (African Union 2008b).49 The ICC’s investigation of 
Omar al-Bashir had already begun, so there seemed to be a blurring of the general 
opposition to universal jurisdiction and the ICC investigation, suggestive of ‘simmering’ 
disenchantment with anti-impunity. But the ICC’s attempt to arrest al-Bashir, a sitting 
                                                 
46 Victor Peskin, International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the Struggle for State 
Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
47 Kurt Mills, ‘“Bashir is Dividing Us”: Africa and the International Criminal Court’, Human Rights Quarterly 34:2 
(2012), p. 419. 
48 African Union, ‘Decision on the Report of the Commission on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal 
Jurisdiction’, 1 July 2008, A.U. Assemb., 11th Ord. Sess., A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/14(XI). 
49 African Union, Press Statement, 11 July 2008, A.U. Peace & Sec. Council, 141st Meeting, A.U. Doc. 
PSC/PR/BR(CXLI). 
 15 
leader, galvanised what had been sporadic and relatively unfocused resistance. The next 
section examines how and why this occurred.   
 
 
‘After al-Bashir’: African resistance to the anti-impunity norm, 2008-2016 
Just days after the AU Assembly and PSC declarations on universal jurisdiction, the 
Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, requested that an arrest warrant be issued against Omar 
al-Bashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity.50 In response, the PSC called on the 
UNSC to defer the matter and to justify this first example of tactical resistance it offered two 
forms of strategic resistance. First, and echoing Rwanda, it argued that universal 
jurisdiction/anti-impunity was being selectively applied against African states and leaders, 
and thereby abused (and it invoked a litany of grievances to establish its case) – this 
represented some of the first assertions of what was to become a widespread perception 
that the ICC was ‘Western tool’. Second, it argued that an ICC prosecution could undermine 
the peace process in Darfur.51 This episode therefore provides early evidence for the AU 
beginning to shift towards resisting the ICC and anti-impunity. To be clear, it had not 
definitively crossed onto the antipreneurial side of the spectrum yet; it was probably still a 
competitor entrepreneur (i.e. wanting to advance anti-impunity, but not exactly in the same 
manner as the ICC), because the PSC also recognised the seriousness of the situation in 
Darfur and called for an investigation into how the AU might address it.  
 
The AU Assembly later also called for deferral, which was ignored,52 and the PSC reiterated 
its position after the ICC issued the arrest warrant against al-Bashir.53 This was despite the 
                                                 
50 International Criminal Court, Press Release, ‘ICC Prosecutor Presents Case Against Sudanese President, 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, for Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes in Darfur’, 14 July 2008: 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=a.  
51 African Union, ‘Communiqué of the 142nd Meeting of the Peace and Security Council’, 21 July 2008, A.U. 
Peace & Sec. Council, 142d mtg., ¶9, A.U. Doc. PSC/MIN/Comm(CXLII)Rev.1. 
52 African Union, ‘Decision on the Application by the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor for the 
Indictment of the President of the Republic of Sudan’, adopted 3 February 2009, A.U. Assemb., 12th Ord. Sess., 
A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.221(XII). 
53 African Union, ‘Communiqué of the 175th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council’, 5 March 2009, A.U. 
Peace & Sec. Council, 175th mtg., ¶4, A.U. Doc. PSC/PR/Comm(CLXXV). 
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fact that many African leaders found al-Bashir troublesome. Soon after, three African ICC 
members – Senegal (the first country to sign the Rome Statute), Djibouti and Comoros – and 
Libya, a non-member – called on African states to withdraw from the ICC. This was rejected 
by a meeting of African ICC members, although most supported the deferral request.54 This 
was the first instance of a second tactical move – threat of withdrawal – and signaled that 
several African ICC members were shifting from entrepreneurial towards more 
antipreneurial stances. 
 
In July 2009, the AU Assembly made several decisions which would structure future African 
resistance and empower African antipreneurs. First, it called for an African court to be 
created to try mass atrocity crimes, which represented a third tactical move. Second, the AU 
Assembly called on African states parties not to cooperate with ICC arrest and surrender 
orders – a clear call to violate core Rome Statute obligations.55 This latter (and fourth) 
example of tactical resistance was particularly shocking given a majority of African ICC 
members could have blocked it. Only Chad officially dissented,56 although Botswana, South 
Africa, Benin and Uganda indicated unease and declared they would arrest al-Bashir if given 
the opportunity.57 
 
The AU’s High Level Panel on Darfur (HLPD), established by the PSC, then entered the fray. It 
argued that justice was a key element of addressing the conflict in Darfur, that Sudan must 
deal with the crimes committed in Darfur, and called for a removal of immunity for ‘State 
actors’. Its decision therefore seemingly reflected the anti-impunity norm. But it also added 
detail to the third tactical resistance move by suggesting a hybrid court with Sudanese and 
non-Sudanese African judges be created to ‘Africanise’ international criminal justice; this 
constitutes a third form of strategic resistance, namely, the notion that African problems 
                                                 
54 ‘African Countries Back Away from ICC Withdrawal Demand’, Sudan Tribune, 8 June 2009: 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article31443. 
55 African Union, ‘Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC)’, adopted 3 July 2009, A.U. Assemb., 13th Ord. Sess., ¶5, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XIII). 
56 Ibid. 
57 Mills, ‘“Bashir is Dividing Us”’, pp. 425-426. 
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require African solutions.58 It was clear that al-Bashir would never be tried by such a court,59 
so we therefore lean towards characterising the HLPD as a creative resister.  
 
It was a notable development; for the first time the peak regional organisation – or at least a 
panel empowered by it – had shifted into an antipreneurial role, even as it rhetorically 
supported anti-impunity. Alternatively, this incident is suggestive of the sorts of dynamics 
described by Acharya’s subsidiarity model60; the HLDP was invoking local non-interference 
norms to resist the application of the ostensibly globally-applicable anti-impunity norm.   
 
The AU calls for the Rome Statute’s amendment 
Before mid-2009 the AU’s resistance had mainly taken place vis-à-vis the UNSC (and in the 
media). But thereafter it shifted to the ICC’s ASP. However, as noted earlier, AU initiatives 
can only be brought before the ASP by dual AU/ICC members, and only they could engage 
directly in discussions, limiting the scope of some African actors to resist.  
 
Before the ASP meeting in November 2009, 26 African ICC members and 15 non-members 
met in Addis Ababa. Four main positions – essentially, demands for reform – emerged: 
 
1. The interests of peace be considered alongside the interests of justice in 
Prosecutorial guidelines for when to investigate, or not; 
2. The power of the UNSC to refer cases should remain; 
3. The UN General Assembly should be empowered to defer ICC proceedings when the 
UNSC fails to make a decision; 
                                                 
58 African Union, ‘Report of the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur, Darfur: The Quest for Peace, Justice, 
and Reconciliation’, 29 October 2009, A.U. Peace & Sec. Council, 207th mtg., ¶215, A.U. Doc. 
PSC/AHG/2(CCVII). 
59 Sudanese judges could not impartially assess the matter of their President’s culpability given ‘judicial 
independence’ is not possible in dictatorial regimes.  
60 Acharya, ‘Norm Subsidiarity’. 
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4. There should be a discussion regarding whether or not the leaders of non-parties 
had their immunity removed by the Rome Statute.61 
 
Four points are relevant. First, a norm of peace was framed in opposition to justice. Second, 
the role of UNSC was deemed as legitimate, which is noteworthy given broader African 
dissatisfaction with its undemocratic and unrepresentative nature. Third, the AU was 
creatively seeking to empower the General Assembly to defer; because it was dominated by 
developing countries, the Assembly would hopefully be a friendlier place for deferral 
discussions (if perhaps more unpredictable). Fourth, the AU was not seeking to re-assert 
‘blanket’ sovereign immunity; instead, it wanted to challenge the UNSC’s power to strip 
leaders of non-ICC members of sovereign immunity. 
 
Ultimately only points 1 and 3 were put to the ASP. Enthusiasm to ‘action’ them was, 
however, limited. South Africa agreed to formally submit them but made it clear that it was 
up to each African ICC member to decide whether to support or not.62 Indeed, South Africa 
may have only agreed to take the lead to head off more drastic measures, such as non-
cooperation or mass withdrawal.63 But only four African ICC members supported point 1 – 
Burkina Faso, Namibia, Senegal, and South Africa – and only Namibia and Senegal supported 
point 3.64 Nevertheless, they were presented to the ASP. Point 1 represented a fifth tactical 
move designed to weaken anti-impunity by providing a new reason not to prosecute, 
backed by the second strategic justification (i.e. applying anti-impunity might endanger 
peace). Point 3 – the attempt to enable ‘forum-shopping’ by empowering the General 
Assembly to defer matters – represented a sixth tactical move. But both proposals were 
rejected by the ASP.65 
                                                 
61 African Union, ‘Report of the 2nd Ministerial Meeting on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC)’, 6 November 2009, A.U. Doc. Min/ICC/legal/Rpt.(II). 
62 African Union, ‘Report of the Commission on the Outcome and Deliberations of the 8th Session of the 
Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC Held at The Hague, Netherlands from 16 to 26 
November’, 26 November 2009, A.U. Exec. Council, 16th Ord. Sess., Annex 2, A.U. Doc. EX.CL/568(XVI). 
63 Mills, ‘“Bashir is Dividing Us”’, pp. 430-431. 
64 African Union, ‘Report of the Commission’. 
65 International Criminal Court, Assembly of State Parties, ‘Report of the Credentials Committee’, ICC-ASP/8/20 
(2009), pp. 47-81. 
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This incident highlighted both the inherent difficulties the AU encounters when it has no 
formal standing in important contestation sites like the ASP, and that formal AU statements 
can mask complicated internal dynamics. In other words, non-ICC members – unapologetic 
antipreneurs – can use peer-pressure in AU meetings to secure anti-ICC resolutions, but 
because they cannot appear in the ASP their ability to ‘follow through’ is limited. The AU 
seems to have been playing a competitor entrepreneur role at his time: it was not rejecting 
anti-impunity outright but was instead ‘feeding-back’ a revised version of the norm, seeking 
changes to its scope and content in a manner reminiscent of Acharya’s circulation model.66 
But the effort was brusquely rebuffed, which no doubt contributed to the subsequent 
stiffening of resistance. 
 
Back to the AU 
After the setback in the ASP, the AU’s Assembly called again for deferral of the al-Bashir 
matter and tried to muster a common African position.67 Then after a separate arrest 
warrant was issued for al-Bashir (for genocide) in July 2010, more strenuous resistance 
began. At the AU summit that month, the Assembly called again for AU members to practice 
non-cooperation and rejected a proposal made at the November 2009 ASP meeting to open 
an ICC-AU liaison office in Addis Ababa.68 The AU Commission Chairperson Jean Ping claimed 
this proposal was part of a ‘plot’ against Africa.69 We therefore treat the rejection of the 
liaison office as a seventh tactical move. These formal positions did mask cracks in the 
perceived unanimity of the African position. ICC members like South Africa, Ghana and 
Botswana argued strongly against efforts by non-members like Libya, Eritrea and Egypt to 
                                                 
66 Acharya, ‘The R2P’. 
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critique anti-impunity and the ICC.70 But other ICC members supported the critics. A trend 
was becoming discernible: the entrepreneurs seemed to have lost momentum, they were 
fighting rear-guard actions and their numbers were dwindling.  
 
At the July 2010 AU summit the President of Malawi, Bingu wa Mutharika, who also Chaired 
the AU, stated that Heads of State and Government should not face ICC prosecution and 
should only be tried by African courts, enabling him to claim he was ‘not condoning 
impunity’.71 This position added nuance to the debate: it did not completely repudiate anti-
impunity but instead it drew on African solidarity norms to modify and circumscribe it. It 
reasserted sovereignty, but an updated version of African sovereignty where African 
problems are addressed with African solutions in a similar manner to how the HLPD had 
recommended handling the al-Bashir matter a year earlier. Indeed, trying al-Bashir in Africa 
was discussed at the July summit, although the debate went nowhere after it became clear 
no existing court could do so. Then, in October 2013, the AU reiterated that international 
courts should have no jurisdiction over sitting African Heads of State and Government72 and 
it began to move forward on creating an African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR) 
by merging the existing African Court of Justice and the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights.73 There is no provision in the Rome Statute for a regional court to substitute 
for the ICC because the principle of complementarity only applies to states (although Kenya 
has made such a proposal to the ASP74). Yet the move to create the ACJHR obviously reflects 
the influence of the ‘African solutions for African problems’ and African solidarity norms75; it 
represents the evolution of what we called earlier the third example of tactical resistance.  
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The HLPD’s call for an ad hoc hybrid court had morphed into moves to create a permanent, 
standing African competitor to the ICC. It is therefore tempting to conclude that the AU was 
still acting as a competitor entrepreneur: it had issued multiple statements supporting anti-
impunity, only qualifying its support by claiming this norm should be implemented by a 
local, not a global, institution. Yet in June 2014 the nuanced 2010 position – that an anti-
impunity norm should be implemented by African courts – was abandoned. While an AU 
summit voted to amend the ACJHR protocol via the Malabo Protocol76 to expand the 
jurisdiction of the court to include international crimes, such as genocide and crimes against 
humanity, it also voted to exclude sitting Heads of State and Government from the new 
court’s jurisdiction.77 The AU had clearly become a creative resister: this eighth tactical 
move – calling for immunity for sitting Heads of State and Government – was now a formal 
demand which directly challenges a core precept of the anti-impunity norm as enumerated 
in the Rome Statute – that no one is immune to prosecution – and amounts to a determined 
defence of the status quo sovereign immunity norm garbed in the cloak of rhetorical 
commitment to anti-impunity.78   
 
We therefore pause briefly to consider which of Acharya’s models best describe the 
prevailing dynamics between African actors and the ICC in mid-2014. On the face of it one 
might conclude norm localisation was taking place: African actors were adapting the anti-
impunity norm to fit ‘local normative priors’. African actors certainly claimed they were 
doing this. But we said earlier that a ‘circumscribed’ anti-impunity norm is nonsensical given 
senior officials have authority to order mass atrocity crimes (and granting them immunity 
creates other problematic incentives). Accordingly, we conclude that by the middle of 2014 
Acharya’s subsidiarity model best describes the prevailing dynamics; local actors were 
invoking non-interference norms to protect themselves against a norm from the global 
centre. 
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Post July-2014: Mass Withdrawal? 
So, by mid-2014 key African actors had shifted decisively into ‘creative resistance mode’. 
Since then little has changed; indeed, the AU’s resistance to anti-impunity has stiffened 
further. For example, in January 2016, the AU Assembly passed a resolution which called for 
the preparation of a roadmap for mass African withdrawal from the ICC ‘if necessary’ (i.e. if 
AU demands for ‘reforms’, including recognising Head of State and Government immunity, 
were rejected).79 It is highly unlikely this demand will be met given how profoundly it 
undermines the anti-impunity norm, and also given many African states continue to support 
the ICC.  
 
Then, in January 2017, the AU Assembly adopted an ICC ‘Withdrawal Strategy’ which 
represented a more nuanced approach to the ICC. It notes that the goals of the AU are to: 
a) Ensure that international justice is conducted in a fair and transparent manner devoid 
of any perception of double standards; 
b) Institution of legal and administrative reforms of the ICC;  
c) Enhance the regionalization of international criminal law; 
d) Encourage the adoption of African Solutions for African problems; 
e) Preserve the dignity, sovereignty and integrity of Member States.80 
This strategy does not actually call for mass withdrawal. Instead, it examines various legal 
issues related to potential withdrawal. It discusses proposed amendments to the Rome 
Statute (identified as ‘preconditions’ for non-withdrawal) the AU would like to see, 
including, most importantly, deferring prosecution for sitting Heads of State or Government, 
while also noting they ‘will not exempt them from criminal liability.’81  
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Thus, the strategy implicitly argues for reform from within, driven by African states. And on 
the face of it Heads of States and Governments should be held accountable, thus seemingly 
reaffirming support for the anti-impunity norm. Yet, by demanding that accountability 
should be deferred, the Withdrawal Strategy continues to fundamentally repudiate a key 
element of the anti-impunity norm – i.e. that no one is above the law and exempt from 
prosecution.  
 
This represents an unresolved paradoxical position: paradoxical because anti-impunity as 
embodied in the Rome Statute makes little sense unless all are subject to the same laws; 
unresolved because fundamental disagreements remain among African ICC members. 
Nigeria, Senegal, Cape Verde, and Liberia entered formal reservations about the strategy, 
while Malawi, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Zambia wanted more time to study it,82 Resistance to 
the ICC was not overwhelming; but neither is there overwhelming support for it. The 
decision should ‘be understood as a decision taken by individual states with competing 
views, rather than a unitary collective body’.83 Nonetheless, it represents a serious challenge 
to anti-impunity.  
 
Accordingly, while mass withdrawal has not happened, we discuss below how three African 
countries have formally moved to withdraw (with two reversing their decisions), and others 
have actively considered doing so. 
 
To briefly summarise this long section, the AU was an entrepreneur supporting the anti-
impunity norm (as it appears in the Rome Statute) for a decade after 1998; ‘adaptive’ 
dynamics of the sort described in Acharya’s localisation model prevailed. But events since 
the request for an al-Bashir arrest warrant in July 2008 tell a very different story. In late 
2009 the AU shifted to a competitor entrepreneur role, trying to leverage its earlier 
resistance to amend how the anti-impunity norm should be implemented by requiring the 
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ICC to weigh peace against justice and by empowering the UNGA to defer cases. Neither 
initiative directly challenged the core of anti-impunity (i.e. that no one should be immune), 
but the prevailing dynamics had changed to ‘feed-back and seek change’ mode, as described 
by Acharya’s circulation model. But after these initiatives failed, the AU’s behaviour – 
especially the moves to create the ACJHR and ‘prepare for’ withdrawal if Heads of State and 
Government immunity is not restored – suggest it has become a creative resister; it makes 
cosmetic concessions to normative change, but ultimately it defends the normative status 
quo. Accordingly, we conclude that since 2010 Acharya’s subsidiarity model, which 
describes resistance by local actors to a norm promoted by ‘central actors’ (in this case an 
international institution),84 best describes the prevailing dynamics. The recent Withdrawal 
Strategy is, again, suggestive of a return to circulation-model dynamics; but the demands for 
reform are quite radical, and given that less-ambitious reform proposals were rejected by 
the ASP in 2009 it seems likely the latest initiative will also fail. We therefore see little 
prospect that resistance will wane any time soon. 
 
 
Antipreneurial African States 
We have focused on the AU-as-actor, but because it is also a site of contestation we now 
examine several key African states which have either indicated their intent to withdraw 
from the ICC (South Africa, Burundi and Gambia) or who have otherwise become resisters 
(Kenya, Uganda, and Namibia). These states have all shifted towards the antipreneurial end 
of the role-spectrum, although their exact role is somewhat unclear given the mixed 
messages emanating from several of them. We also do not suggest that there are no African 
entrepreneurs anymore (see below). 
 
Further, we note that by mid-2016 al-Bashir had traveled to the following African ICC-
member states without being arrested: Chad (2010, 2011, 2013 (twice), 2014), Kenya 
(2010), Djibouti (2011, 2016), Malawi (2011), Nigeria (2013), Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (2014), South Africa (2015) and Uganda (2016). Earlier we called the AU’s decision to 
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call for non-cooperation with the ICC in July 2009 the fourth instance of tactical resistance. 
Obviously these specific decisions by states to allow al-Bashir to travel with impunity are 
linked to it and, together, they constitute a particularly effective act of resistance.  
 
Burundi 
Burundi was the first African state to formally indicate its intention to withdraw (in October 
2016). The government asserted that the ICC was an instrument for powerful countries to 
punish the weak who do not do their bidding. Senior government figures were facing an ICC 
investigation for post-election violence in 2015,85 and thus may have been trying to avoid 
the potential repercussions of an investigation, demonstrating the weakness of its 
commitment to anti-impunity and the self-interested nature of the withdrawal decision. 
 
South Africa 
Despite initially being a strong ICC-supporter, the question of whether to action the al-
Bashir arrest warrant proved troubling for South Africa. Pretoria stated in 2009 that it would 
arrest al-Bashir if he came to South Africa (if a bit reluctantly),86 so he avoided travelling 
there for several years. But as we saw above, in 2009 South Africa – somewhat reluctantly – 
did present the AU’s proposals for amending the Rome Statute to the ASP. And by March 
2014 Pretoria was shifting towards the antipreneurial end of the role-spectrum. For 
example, Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe supported creating the ACJHR, saying doing 
so responded to ‘the yearnings of ordinary Africans for justice whilst being sensitive to the 
unique nature of the Africa context’.87  
 
Then in June 2015 al-Bashir travelled to South Africa to attend an AU summit. The South 
Gauteng High Court immediately ordered he be prevented from leaving until it could 
determine whether or not he should be arrested. The court subsequently issued an arrest 
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warrant, but before it could be executed al-Bashir was spirited away from the conference to 
an air force base and flown home. Pretoria argued that al-Bashir held ‘special’ immunity 
because he was a Head of State attending an AU summit.88 South Africa had privileged 
African solidarity over human rights before,89 and this incident was a very clear example of 
the fourth resistance tactic – non-cooperation – in action. The South African courts, 
however, ruled that the government had violated its international obligations, which had 
been enshrined in domestic law in 2002.90 Despite these domestic legal challenges, Pretoria 
then stunned the world when it announced on 21 October 2016 it would withdraw from the 
ICC.  
 
South Africa’s position towards anti-impunity has therefore changed significantly. It claims 
that it has not rejected it because in its instrument of withdrawal the government noted the 
country’s commitment to fighting impunity. Yet, this commitment appears to be in conflict 
with its commitment to recognise diplomatic immunity (i.e. failing to do so could allegedly 
lead to ‘regime change’) and its commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the 
arguments it offered to justify withdrawing.91 Nevertheless, domestic opposition to 
withdrawal intensified, and on 22 February 2017, in response to the Democratic Alliance’s 
petition, the High Court found that the government did not have the authority to withdraw 
without the consent of parliament and ordered the withdrawal be revoked,92 which 
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occurred on 7 March.93 The government also revoked a bill which would have repealed 
national laws which outlawed genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.94 
 
While domestic proceedings were occurring, the ICC decided in December 2016 that it 
would rule on whether South Africa had acted unlawfully when it did not arrest Bashir.95 A 
hearing was held on 7 April 2017, and the Court published its decision on 6 July. It found 
that South Africa had violated its obligations under the Rome Statute. At the same time, it 
decided not to refer South Africa to the UNSC. The Pre-Trial Chamber noted that it had 
made six other referrals to the UNSC for non-cooperation in the Bashir case, with no effect 
(indeed there had been a total of 13 prior findings of noncooperation and/or referrals for 
action96). It also noted that the government had withdrawn its appeal against the decision 
by the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa that its actions were illegal, thus leading to 
the conclusion that the government has presumably accepted its obligations to cooperate 
with the Court. 97 
 
It is unclear when or if the South African government might attempt to gain parliamentary 
approval for a withdrawal, with the Justice Minister, Michael Masutha, having withdrawn a 
relevant bill on 14 March 201798 and other domestic priorities crowding out the matter.99 
Indeed, while a discussion document still frames ‘manipulation’ of the ICC in terms of anti-
imperialism, reiterates grievances about the UNSC, and argues that the ACJHR should deal 
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with mass atrocity crimes,100 this document is noticeably more restrained than a similar 
2015 document.101 Yet, President Jacob Zuma stated in June 2017 ‘that the decision to 
withdraw is a principle matter and the principle still stands,’ and that the government was 
working ‘to rectify the procedural challenges’. At the same time, he also noted the 
reluctance of African states to engage in a mass withdrawal.102 South Africa is therefore a 
highly conflicted country which has traversed almost the full range of the norm dynamics 
role-spectrum; we conclude that it is currently sitting at a tipping point between the 
entrepreneurial and antipreneurial sides, demonstrating the fluidity of these identities and 
correlated interests. 
 
Gambia 
In late October 2016, Gambia also officially announced it intended to withdraw. It repeated 
the accusation that the ICC was targeting Africans – calling it the ‘International Caucasian 
Court for the persecution and humiliation of people of colour, especially Africans’.103 It also 
argued that Western war criminals have not been prosecuted, and it had tried to get the ICC 
to prosecute EU states for migrants drowned in the Mediterranean. But it had also been 
accused of election-related repression.104 Thus, while voicing broad normative themes – e.g. 
discrimination against Africans – the main explanation for the withdrawal appears to be the 
government’s naked self-interest.  
 
To complicate matters, after the withdrawal was announced the incumbent President, 
Yahya Jammeh, lost an election, and the President-elect, Adama Barrow, vowed to reverse 
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the withdrawal decision.105 Jammeh subsequently rejected the results and engaged in 
further repression, but he was eventually forced to step down and Barrow revoked the 
withdrawal on 10 February 2017,106 noting Gambia’s commitment to human rights and the 
‘principles enshrined in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’.107 This 
incident demonstrates how unstable some African states’ interests and normative 
commitments can be. 
 
Kenya 
Until the recent moves to withdrawal, Kenya had moved the furthest towards the 
antipreneurial end of the role-spectrum. In late 2009 the ICC opened an investigation into 
post-election violence in 2007, resulting in the indictment of several Kenyans, including 
persons (Kenyatta and Ruto) who would later become President and Vice-President. They 
both sought to delay proceedings and repeatedly denounced the ICC at political rallies (as a 
threat to Kenyan sovereignty, a destabilising force, and an insulter of African pride) and 
allegedly began to ‘eliminate, intimidate or bribe’ witnesses’.108 As we saw at the outset, 
they eventually succeeded and charges were dropped (but ‘without prejudice’, meaning 
they could be refiled).109 
 
Kenya has also taken actions contrary to the anti-impunity norm which are technically 
independent of – but are obviously connected to – its direct dealings with the ICC. In August 
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2010 al-Bashir travelled to Kenya.110 In January 2011 the AU Assembly supported Kenya’s 
decision to not arrest al-Bashir and called for deferral of the ICC proceedings in Kenya111 – 
although in November 2011 a Kenyan court directed that al-Bashir be arrested if he traveled 
to Kenya again.112 In 2013 the Kenyan parliament voted to withdraw from the ICC, although 
President Kenyatta did not act on this. Kenya has also been leading efforts to amend Article 
27 of the Rome Statute to give sitting Heads of State and Government immunity and has 
also backed preparations in the AU to secure a mass African withdrawal from the ICC if the 
amendment push fails.113 Thus, while Kenya rhetorically supports anti-impunity, it has 
actually worked hard to undermine fundamental aspects of the norm.  
 
Uganda 
Uganda was the first state to refer a matter to the ICC Prosecutor, which suggests it was a 
norm entrepreneur in 2003. But the reality is much more complicated since Uganda 
attempted to use the ICC as a weapon against the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).114 But 
by 2008 Kampala began to consider the ICC as an obstacle, not a resource, on the basis that 
the ICC investigation was obstructing peace negotiations with the LRA.115  
 
President Museveni therefore began promoting an alternative norm to anti-impunity, the 
interests of peace over justice (an argument also deployed vis-à-vis al-Bashir case). But the 
shift was not immediately a comprehensive one because Kampala argued for watering down 
the July 2010 AU statement on non-cooperation,116 and in 2009 it revoked an invitation to 
al-Bashir to attend a summit in Uganda. But over time Uganda’s resistance hardened: 
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Museveni subsequently called the ICC a Western ‘tool that is out to punish Africa’;117 in May 
2016 al-Bashir visited Uganda to attend Museveni’s fifth Presidential inauguration and was 
not arrested; and Museveni denounced the ICC as a ‘bunch of useless people’118 – even 
though a year earlier he allowed the LRA commander Dominic Ongwen to be transferred to 
the ICC.119 
 
Uganda has thus become an outspoken critic of the ICC. Its government is seemingly not 
‘committed to’ or truly ‘constituted by’ anti-impunity; it used the norm instrumentally when 
its interests suited doing so, but it invoked alternative norms – peace over justice and 
African solidarity – when doing so became expedient. And if that instrumentality is no 
longer compelling enough, it might leave the court: in October 2016 a Ugandan cabinet 
minister suggested that the withdrawal process had already begun,120 although in April 2017 
the Ugandan attorney general, William Byaruhanga, stated that while Uganda had concerns 
about the Court, it had ‘not considered withdrawing’.121 
 
Namibia 
The Namibian government announced in 2015122 and 2016123 that it intended to withdraw 
from the ICC, although it hasn’t yet. Its reasons are similar to the other states’, namely, that 
the ICC is biased against Africa and is essentially pursues regime change in Africa. In 
February 2017, the government indicated that it supported what it described as the AU 
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Assembly’s decision for a collective withdrawal from the ICC (thus miscasting the actual 
decision). It cited the demand for sitting presidents to be allowed to serve their terms in 
office before being tried by the ICC, tying this directly to the issue of peace and stability124 
(although this contradicts a subsequent statement). 
 
Thus these six states have moved towards the antipreneurial side of the role-spectrum, 
although not all have done so decisively. A somewhat confused and chaotic situation is 
presented. While not necessarily ‘pure’ antipreneurs – none have completely repudiated 
the anti-impunity norm – they are certainly creative resisters (with perhaps the exception of 
Gambia after its government changed), attempting to at least partially hollow out the anti-
impunity norm, including by putting forth alternative proposals for how it might be 
implemented, while essentially defending the status quo sovereign immunity norm. While 
we recognise ongoing support for other aspects of anti-impunity, five of these six states 
continue to call for an exemption from prosecution for sitting Heads of State and 
Government, representing a rejection of the core of the anti-impunity norm – that no one is 
above the law. 
 
The Supporters 
There is still significant support for the ICC in Africa. Four African countries have joined since 
2010 (Seychelles, Tunisia, Cape Verde and Côte d’Ivoire).125 Botswana remains an outspoken 
ICC-supporter, challenging anti-ICC statements from the AU, declaring that it would arrest 
al-Bashir if given an opportunity, and stating in 2010 – somewhat ironically given the AU’s 
penchant for invoking sovereignty concerns – that ‘we have not surrendered [our] 
sovereignty … to the AU’.126 In July 2017 it formally domesticated the Rome Statute which, 
the Minister for Defense, Justice and Security, Shaw Kgathi, said ‘lifts’ diplomatic 
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immunity.127 And in July 2016 Botswana, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia, Côte d’Ivoire and Algeria 
pushed back against calls for mass withdrawal at the 27th African Union Summit, preventing 
the proposal from being included on the agenda.128 
 
After the withdrawal announcements in late 2016 numerous African civil society 
organisations protested,129 and Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Tanzania, and Zambia reiterated their support for the ICC. At the 2016 ASP in 
December, other African states reiterated their support for the ICC (including both Namibia 
and Uganda, seemingly contradicting their statements about withdrawing). Even after it had 
initiated its withdrawal, South Africa had ‘expressed hope for dialogue that could forestall … 
withdrawal’130 and also indicated that it would continue to cooperate with the ICC until its 
withdrawal was completed.131 Senegal has also seemingly changed its stance (recall it had 
called for withdrawal in 2009, after having been a strong early supporter). And after the AU 
approved the Withdrawal Strategy in early 2017 a number of countries expressed significant 
reservations. Therefore, recent events demonstrate that the entrepreneurial camp is not 
just ‘bleeding members’ – and Jacob Zuma’s June 2017 statement reinforces this 
perception.132 And the moves towards antipreneurialism by several states have proven to be 
less decisive than they initially appeared, even though significant tensions and push factors 
in favour of withdrawal remain, and non-cooperation remains a serious challenge to the 
viability of the ICC. 
 
Conclusion 
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African actors have been resisting anti-impunity in the form it takes in the Rome Statute, 
and the efforts of the ICC to implement it, since the ICC Prosecutor requested an arrest 
warrant for Omar al-Bashir. There were some ‘rumblings of discontent’ before then, but this 
event galvanized African resistance, morphing into full-blown resistance against the ICC on 
the part of some African ICC members, and while two countries – for different reasons – 
turned back from the brink of withdrawal – there is little evidence that resistance will wane 
in the foreseeable future.  
 
We canvassed a number of ways African actors practiced resistance, organised according to 
a conceptual distinction between strategic (i.e. justifications) and tactical (i.e. discrete 
moves) resistance. There were, in effect, three of the former. First, African actors justified 
resisting by invoking the sovereignty norm, arguing that anti-impunity was being abused and 
that African states’ sovereignty was imperiled. Second, they argued that sometimes the 
interests of peace should be prioritised over, or at least weighed against, the pursuit of 
justice. Third, they invoked local norms like ‘African solidarity’ and ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ (which are related to wider norms like anti-imperialism). These 
justifications then informed or supported eight types of tactical resistance: African actors 
called on the UNSC to defer ICC proceedings; threatened mass African withdrawal from the 
ICC; attempted to create alternate African judicial structures; called for non-cooperation 
with the ICC; demanded prosecutorial guidelines be changed; sought to empower the UN 
General Assembly to defer ICC proceedings; prevented the ICC establishing an AU liaison 
office; and called for the Rome Statue’s amendment to recognise Head of State and 
Government immunity. 
 
Interestingly, the use of this strategic/tactical distinction suggests that while the two types 
of resistance are related, they serve somewhat different functions or are directed towards 
somewhat different audiences. Specifically, strategic resistance is perhaps directed more 
towards other African actors, to achieve African unity, especially in AU forums. It is of course 
directed towards non-African actors too; after all, supporting one’s case by presenting 
purely self-interested arguments is generally an unpersuasive strategy, so these 
justifications at minimum provide ‘higher-purpose’ reasons for resisting. African actors 
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failed to convince many non-Africans to support or acquiesce to their demands, but one 
outcome is clear: enough African actors are now convinced-enough that anti-impunity (and 
the ICC) threatens their interests for the AU to become an important vehicle for practicing 
tactical resistance. Thus tactical resistance is directed more towards ‘global-level opponents’ 
(or it takes place in global-level contestation-sites).  
 
And many of these tactical moves have essentially failed: the Council has not deferred any 
ICC proceedings; no mass African withdrawal has taken place; alternative judicial structures 
have not yet been implemented; prosecutorial guidelines have not been changed; the 
General Assembly cannot defer proceedings; and the Rome Statute does not confer 
immunity to Heads of State and Government. The only outright successes have been the 
decision to not establish an AU-ICC liaison office and the call for noncooperation. The three 
recent withdrawals (with two reversals) represent only a partially successful resistance 
tactic, although this tactic does have potential for significant disruption in the future.  
 
These findings therefore have several important implications. The withdrawal of three 
African states seemed – as 2017 dawned – to have dealt the effort to entrench the anti-
impunity norm – and by extension, the ICC itself – a severe below. Yet the two reversals 
demonstrate that the resistance is by no means monolithic. The Gambian reversal was 
accompanied by strong rhetorical support for the ICC and anti-impunity by the new 
President. The reversal by South Africa demonstrates the power of domestic legal and civil 
society organisations to push back against governments when they seek to undermine anti-
impunity. Yet, the development of the norm has certainly stalled, and could lose further 
ground if additional states move to withdraw, or if South Africa reinstates its withdrawal. 
The fact that non-cooperation practices – most notable regarding the matter of arresting al-
Bashir – have become very common is also very troubling given how heavily the ICC relies 
on members for assistance. Non-cooperation has, at minimum, significantly undermined the 
ICC’s ability to implement the anti-impunity norm.  
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Yet the ICC does not operate in Africa alone; indeed, the Prosecutor is currently 
preliminarily examining five ‘situations’ outside Africa133 and one, Georgia, has been 
upgraded to a formal investigation.134 Yet no arrest warrants have been issued in these 
cases, let alone warrants against senior political figures. Executing warrants of this sort 
would constitute strong evidence that the anti-impunity norm was advancing, so we caution 
against finding the effort to entrench anti-impunity has made major strides forward until 
such occurs or, at minimum, until issuing such does not provoke the sort of reaction that the 
al-Bashir warrant precipitated in Africa. And as an aside, while the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber 
has repeatedly admonished African states for not arresting al-Bashir, the ASP has not yet 
punished any non-cooperating states and while the ICC has referred several to the UNSC135 
the Council has also taken no action against them. The ICC’s decision not to refer South 
Africa to the UNSC is perhaps partly a recognition of the futility of such referrals. As noted 
earlier, the reactions by third parties to violations of norms, rules or laws profoundly affects 
judgments about their efficacy or strength; as Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope put it, 
‘when posited rules are consistently evaded or undermined without legal consequence, the 
rules themselves are compromised’.136 They had the R2P norm in mind, but the same logic 
applies to the legal requirement for member states to assist the ICC. This buttresses our 
finding that the effort to entrench the anti-impunity norm has at minimum stalled – and 
could go backwards if noncooperation continues.   
 
Having said this, resistance is not uniform in Africa: while the resisters seem to have in 
effect ‘captured’ the AU, enabling them to deploy it to organise and legitimise resistance, 
many African states remain ICC supporters. And while the resisters seem to have the upper 
hand, most seem to actually want to make the anti-impunity a permissive norm; they are 
not happy with it being a strong prescriptive137 norm, but they do not want to ‘roll-back’ the 
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normative status quo to the strict-sovereign immunity position. Instead they want more 
discretion over when and how to apply it in African contexts – albeit in a manner which does 
provide immunity to senior political figures. This does not of course bode well for the pure 
version of anti-impunity – which brooks no exceptions – which the ICC has been seeking to 
entrench since 2002. But it is nevertheless apparent that the normative status quo has 
shifted substantially since then, meaning it seems unlikely we will see a return of traditional, 
strict-sovereign immunity, and the practice of indicting former leaders has arguably become 
quite well entrenched (although this creates its own problems, especially incentives for 
sitting leaders to remain in office, a troubling recent trend in Africa).138  
 
Several important theoretical findings also flow from this analysis. The first is that, in effect, 
‘practice matters’ (profoundly). In a system of law without strong enforcement mechanisms 
– like the contemporary international system – many states must be constituted by a 
law/norm for it to be very effective. Thus while one might presume that because five of 
eight tactical resistance moves failed – and one has so far had limited effect – resistance 
overall failed. But one tactic – non-cooperation – was especially potent. This might be a 
unique feature of this case given how reliant the ICC is on members’ cooperation. But it 
nevertheless demonstrates the limitations of consent-based systems of global governance 
and the importance of norm-conforming practice. Withdrawing may become an even more 
potent resistance tactic. At minimum withdrawing states will, by definition, not be 
cooperating with the ICC. Withdrawals also provide a precedent for additional withdrawals, 
further undermining prospects for cooperation. More generally, each withdrawal deals a 
blow to the ICC’s credibility as an inclusive international organisation, and its aspirations for 
universality.  
 
Further theoretical findings can be made vis-à-vis the entrepreneur-antipreneur framework 
itself. Most obviously, resisters in this case did not enjoy ‘overwhelming’, or even 
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‘substantial’ advantages. They did enjoy advantages in the realm of practice as we have just 
seen: in particular non-cooperation with an emerging norm is a potent resistance tactic. But 
they did not enjoy clear advantages in the realm of institutionalisation because the anti-
impunity norm has already been codified in the Rome Statute and the ICC has been 
established. This has allowed pro-anti-impunity entrepreneurs to block African states’ 
demands for the Rome Statute to be amended; securing an 88 percent majority in the ASP is 
extremely difficult. And two ICC members – France and Britain – can veto attempts to defer 
ICC proceedings at the UNSC. Thus some ‘frustrating’ and ‘blocking’ opportunities – which 
Bloomfield argued typically accrue to antipreneurs – are actually enjoyed by entrepreneurs 
in this case. Having said that, China and Russia (non-ICC members) can also veto attempts to 
punish violators and thereby undermine efforts to entrench anti-impunity. Thus we find that 
this case does suggest that antipreneurs do on balance enjoy some, but not ‘strong’, 
defensive advantages simply because entrepreneurs must initiate and sustain momentum 
for normative change. In short, stalemate constitutes a ‘win’ for antipreneurs – not a 
resounding one, but a win nonetheless – which reinforces how much practice matters in 
consent-based governance systems. 
 
In a more abstract sense, this case clearly demonstrates Risse’s logic of argument at work. 
ICC-resisters have invoked alternative norms and framings to justify their actions: they 
invoked the status quo sovereignty norm to defend Africa from perceived bias and abuse by 
the West; they invoked an alternative norm – peace – to argue for immunity for sitting 
Heads of State and Government; and they deployed African solidarity norms to argue for 
regional over global justice mechanisms. These are arguments over which norms to 
implement in a given situation, as well as how to implement the anti-impunity norm. Some 
of the argumentation is within a truly ‘open frame’ where actors’ preferences are open to 
discursive challenge.139 There may thus be real disagreements about whether or not it is 
truly best to allow a brutal dictator to continue their atrocities unimpeded to facilitate a 
broader peace settlement. However, much of the ‘arguing’ seems to have been ‘strategic’, 
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intended to convince others of a fixed position rather than suggesting that actor was open 
to persuasion.140  
 
The question of how open the arguing has been is beyond the scope of this article, as is the 
question of definitively determining the motivations of all of the different actors. We have 
no doubt that there are real disagreements about normative priorities, while at the same 
time these disagreements may also mask more self-interested motivations. Our task is not 
to evaluate the validity of these disagreements and normative positions, but rather to 
examine the dynamics of contestation over these positions. And it incontestable that the AU 
and some African states have used these arguments to call into question and undermine a 
fundamental element of the anti-impunity norm – i.e. that nobody, regardless of status, is 
exempt from prosecution for atrocity crimes. One might argue that such actors are norm 
entrepreneurs, supporting norms of peace or African solidarity. This may be true – again, a 
deep investigation of the motivations is beyond the scope of this article – but that does not 
forestall identification of antipreneurial behaviour vis-à-vis the anti-impunity norm. 
 
Finally, we noted earlier that identifying whether and how far actors shift along the role-
spectrum helps determine which of Acharya’s three models best describes prevailing 
dynamics in norm contestation contexts at particular points in time. The utility of doing so 
lies in the fact that these models describe outcomes: adaptation leading to successful norm 
diffusion; resistance, meaning the norm does not successfully diffuse (at least not to all 
regions); and feed-back, which implies the norm’s scope and content might change. 
Identifying which dynamics prevail has two potential uses, although we only present these 
as potential directions for future research. 
 
First, it may aid research design in that hypotheses can be derived from each model and 
then tested. For example, evidence of actors invoking competing ‘normative priors’ might 
suggest resistance is stiffening, but arguably two outcomes are possible; these actors may 
be trying to defeat the norm outright (or maybe just its relevance in their region) – making 
                                                 
140 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
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them ‘pure’ antipreneurs – or they may be preparing to feed it back to the global centre for 
renegotiation. Scholars could therefore examine key actors closely; if they were shifting into 
antipreneurial roles it would suggest diffusion was faltering, but if they were behaving more 
like competitor entrepreneurs then it would suggest further negotiations were looming.  
 
Second (and we make this point even more tentatively) being aware that key actors may 
shift along the spectrum – changing the prevailing dynamics as they do so – could have 
policy implications. Specifically, it might alert norm entrepreneurs to the need to alter their 
promotional activities. They may decide they need to devote more resources to lobbying an 
actor directly to ensure it remains a pure entrepreneur; or they may need to focus on 
‘exposing’ a creative resister as a ‘Trojan Horse’, an actor which rhetorically supports the 
challenger norm but who, in actuality, primarily seeks to defend the normative status quo.  
 
Identifying the emergence of more competitor entrepreneurs might be the most interesting 
scenario. It may suggest the original champions of the norm may have to begin deciding 
where their ‘red lines’ lie. For example, and in the context of this case, would champions of 
anti-impunity be prepared to include recognition of Head of State and Government 
immunity in the Rome Statue? Probably not, because doing so would strike at the core of 
anti-impunity, although they might be prepared to make less-substantial concessions, like 
extending the principle of complementarity to encompass regional courts. Nevertheless, the 
strength of contemporary African resistance makes it difficult to envisage concessions 
adequate-enough to mollify resisters; would, for example, ICC-supporters agree to extend 
complementarity to an ACJHR which could not try Heads of State and Government? Again, 
probably not, yet many African states envisage the ACJHR being limited in this way. 
Accordingly, the prospects of the anti-impunity norm emerging from the current impasse 
and resuming its advance towards becoming the normative status quo may, for the moment 
at least, largely depend on the success of the ICC’s investigations in regions other than 
Africa. 
